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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONATHAN GROCE and SUSAN HOROWITZ, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

NETFLIX, INC., WAL-MART STORES, INC., and
WALMART.COM USA LLC,

Defendants.

Case No. 09-cv-0139 MEJ

**DECLARATION OF ALEX C. TURAN
IN SUPPORT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTION TO CONSIDER WHETHER
CASES SHOULD BE RELATED**

1 I, Alex C. Turan, declare as follows:

2 1. I am a member in good standing of the California State Bar and an attorney at the law
3 firm of Girard Gibbs LLP, counsel of record for Plaintiffs in *Jonathan Groce, et al. v. Netflix, Inc., et*
4 *al.*, Case No. 09-cv-0139 MEJ. I make this declaration based on my personal knowledge, and if called
5 to testify to the contents, I could and would competently do so.

6 2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the class action complaint filed on
7 January 2, 2009 in *Resnick, et al. v. Walmart.com USA LLC, et al.*, Case No. 09-cv-0002, and
8 assigned to the Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton.

9 3. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the class action complaint filed on
10 January 12, 2009 in *Groce, et al. v. Netflix, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 09-cv-0139 MEJ.

11 4. Defendants that have been sued in *Groce* have yet to appear in the action. Local Rule
12 3-12 requires an Administrative Motion to Consider Whether Cases Should Be Related to be filed
13 promptly. Therefore, a stipulation could not be entered prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' Administrative
14 Motion.

15 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing facts are true and correct and that this
16 declaration was executed this 14th day of January, 2009, in San Francisco, California.

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18 By: /s/ Alex C. Turan
19 Alex C. Turan
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EXHIBIT A

ORIGINAL

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

27 ANDREA RESNICK, GARY BUNKER, JOHN)
 28 HALEY, AMY LATHAM, ERIC ROSLANSKY,)
 and KEVIN SIMPSON, on behalf of themselves)
 and others similarly situated,)
Plaintiffs,)
 v.)

29 WALMART.COM USA LLC, WAL-MART)
 30 STORES, INC and NETFLIX, INC.,)
Defendants.)

E-filing

Case No. **CV 09 0002**

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

MEJ

(Signature)
FILED
 JAN - 2 2009
 RICHARD W. WIEKING
 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(Signature)

FAXED

HOWREY LLP

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
 Case No.

1 NOW COME Plaintiffs, ANDREA RESNICK, GARY BUNKER, JOHN HALEY, AMY LATHAM, ERIC
 2 ROSLANSKY, and KEVIN SIMPSON, for their Complaint brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
 3 Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2, and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15
 4 U.S.C. §§15 & 29, for treble damages and injunctive relief against Defendants Netflix, Inc. ("Netflix"),
 5 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart Stores"), and Walmart.com USA LLC ("Walmart.com").

6 Based upon personal knowledge, information, and belief, and the investigation of counsel,
 7 Plaintiffs allege as follows:

8 NATURE OF THE ACTION

9 1. On or about May 19, 2005, Netflix, Wal-Mart Stores, and Walmart.com, a wholly owned
 10 subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores, entered into an agreement to divide the markets for the sales and online
 11 rentals of DVDs in the United States ("Market Division Agreement"), with the purpose and effect of
 12 monopolizing and unreasonably restraining trade in at least the online DVD rental market.

13 2. The meetings that led to the conspiracy began in January 2005, when Reed Hastings, the
 14 CEO of Netflix, and John Fleming, then the CEO of Walmart.com, met with each other for dinner to
 15 discuss the online DVD rental and DVD sales markets and how they could reach an agreement that
 16 would reduce or eliminate competition in those markets. According to Hastings, having "noticed how
 17 low Wal-Mart's prices [for DVDs] were," he "called the CEO [of Walmart.com] in January and asked
 18 if he could have dinner." Fleming, who reported directly to Wal-Mart Stores' CEO Lee Scott,
 19 accepted Hastings' invitation; the two thereafter met and, as a result of the meetings and exchanges
 20 that followed, Defendants entered into the contract, combination, and conspiracy alleged herein. At
 21 the time of their initial meeting and prior to entering into the Market Division Agreement, Netflix and
 22 Walmart.com were direct competitors in renting DVDs online and all three defendants were potential
 23 competitors in selling new DVDs to consumers. However, by no later than May 19, 2005, Netflix,
 24 Wal-Mart Stores, and Walmart.com entered into an agreement by which Walmart.com would stop
 25 competing with Netflix in the online DVD rental business and Netflix would promote the sales of new
 26 DVDs by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com, and not sell new DVDs in competition with them.

27 3. Wal-Mart Stores actively participated in this conspiracy. This is confirmed by, among
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1 other things, the fact that prior to the announcement of the Market Division Agreement, John Fleming
2 was promoted to Chief Marketing Officer of Wal-Mart Stores. As of the time of the announcement of
3 the Market Division Agreement, Fleming thus was acting in his capacity both as the Chief Marketing
4 Officer of Wal-Mart Stores and the Wal-Mart Stores executive responsible for overseeing the
5 operations of Walmart.com. As Chief Marketing Officer of Wal-Mart Stores, Fleming was responsible
6 for deciding "what the largest, most powerful retailer in history will stock on its shelves, and how
7 much those products will cost. Such decisions, when made at Wal-Mart, can help make or break entire
8 industries."

9 4. Defendants' conspiracy enabled Netflix to charge its customers higher subscription prices
10 for the rental of DVDs than it otherwise would have. As a result of their contract, combination, and
11 conspiracy as well as Netflix's unlawfully acquired and maintained market and monopoly power,
12 Netflix actually did overcharge Plaintiffs, and millions of other consumers similarly situated, and
13 continues to do so.

14 5. Under the Market Division Agreement, Netflix, Wal-Mart Stores, and Walmart.com agreed
15 that they would restrain trade and eliminate competition. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com agreed
16 that Walmart.com would stop competing with Netflix in the online rental market. Netflix agreed that it
17 would not sell new DVDs, but instead would promote the DVD sales of Wal-Mart Stores and
18 Walmart.com. In agreeing to promote the sale of DVDs by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com,
19 Netflix provided consideration for the agreement by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com that
20 Walmart.com would exit the online DVD rental market and simultaneously confirmed to Wal-Mart
21 Stores and Walmart.com that Netflix would not enter the market to sell new DVDs, as Netflix was
22 well-positioned and otherwise had the unilateral economic incentive to do. Since entering into the
23 Market Division Agreement, neither Wal-Mart Stores nor Walmart.com have rented DVDs online and
24 Netflix has not sold new DVDs. The Market Division Agreement served to entrench and enhance
25 Defendants' dominant market positions and otherwise cause harm to competition, including enabling
26 Netflix to charge higher subscription prices for online DVD rentals than it would have had they not
27 entered into the agreement. Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated consumers in fact paid the higher
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1 subscription prices to Netflix.

2 6. As alleged below, this case is brought as a class action on behalf of all consumers in the
3 United States who, during the period May 19, 2005, to the present (hereinafter, the "Class Period"),
4 paid a subscription fee to rent DVDs from Netflix. Plaintiffs bring this action under Sections 4 and 16
5 of the Clayton Antitrust Act to seek redress in the form of treble damages and other relief for their
6 injuries resulting from Defendants' violations of law on behalf of themselves and other similarly
7 injured consumers nationwide and to seek a declaration that the Market Division Agreement is null and
8 void.

9 **PLAINTIFFS**

10 7. ANDREA RESNICK ("Resnick") is an individual consumer who resides in San Francisco,
11 California. During the Class Period, Resnick directly subscribed to Netflix for her personal, non-
12 commercial use. The subscription fees Resnick paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than she
13 would have paid, but for the antitrust violations alleged herein.

14 8. GARY BUNKER ("Bunker") is an individual consumer who resides in San Angelo, Texas.
15 During the Class Period, Bunker directly subscribed to Netflix for his personal, non-commercial use.
16 The subscription fees Bunker paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than he would have paid,
17 but for the antitrust violations alleged herein.

18 9. JOHN HALEY ("Haley") is an individual consumer who resides in Fairfax, Virginia. During
19 the Class Period, Haley directly subscribed to Netflix for his personal, non-commercial use. The
20 subscription fees Haley paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than he would have paid, but for
21 the antitrust violations alleged herein.

22 10. AMY LATHAM ("Latham") is an individual consumer, who resides in Bristow, Virginia.
23 During the Class Period, Latham directly subscribed to Netflix for her personal, non-commercial use.
24 The subscription fees Latham paid for renting DVDs were greater than she would have paid, but for
25 the antitrust violations alleged herein.

26 11. ERIC ROSLANSKY ("Roslansky") is an individual consumer who resides in Boulder,
27 Colorado. During the Class Period, Roslansky directly subscribed to Netflix for his personal, non-

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1 commercial use. The subscription fees Roslansky paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than
2 he would have paid, but for the antitrust violations alleged herein.

3 12. KEVIN SIMPSON ("Simpson") is an individual consumer who resides in Washington, DC.
4 During the Class Period, Simpson directly subscribed to Netflix for his personal, non-commercial use.
5 The subscription fees Simpson paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than he would have paid,
6 but for the antitrust violations alleged herein.

7 **DEFENDANTS**

8 **NETFLIX**

9 13. Defendant Netflix is a Delaware corporation headquartered at 100 Winchester Circle, Los
10 Gatos, California, 95032. Netflix is publicly traded on the NASDAQ under the symbol NFLX. Its
11 revenues earned from engaging in interstate commerce exceed \$1 Billion annually. Through its
12 website, www.netflix.com, Netflix rents DVDs directly to consumers nationwide by charging monthly
13 subscription fees, which entitle customers to rent DVDs pursuant to various subscription plans. Netflix
14 has possessed a market share of at least 75% of the Online DVD Rental Market in the United States, as
15 defined herein, at all times during the Class Period.

16 **WAL-MART**

17 14. **Wal-Mart Stores.** Defendant Wal-Mart Stores is the largest retailer in the United States.
18 Wal-Mart Stores is a Delaware corporation headquartered at 702 S.W. 8th Street, Bentonville,
19 Arkansas, 72716. Wal-Mart Stores is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the
20 symbol WMT. Its revenues earned from engaging in interstate and foreign commerce approach \$400
21 Billion annually. Through its retail stores and its website, www.walmart.com, Wal-Mart Stores sells
22 DVDs directly to consumers nationwide. Wal-Mart Stores sells far more DVDs than any other retailer
23 in the United States, accounting for about 40% of all new DVDs sold to consumers domestically. Prior
24 to the Market Division Agreement, Wal-Mart Stores' wholly-owned subsidiary Walmart.com
25 competed with Netflix in the Online DVD Rental Market through the "Walmart DVD Rentals" service,
26 which was available on www.walmart.com.

1 **15. Walmart.com.** Defendant Walmart.com is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores.
2 Walmart.com is a Delaware company with its headquarters at 7000 Marina Boulevard, Brisbane,
3 California, 94005. It is the online component of Wal-Mart Stores' retail empire that is the leading
4 seller of new DVDs in the United States. Prior to the conspiracy alleged herein, Walmart.com was
5 also a major competitor of Netflix in the Online DVD Rental Market through the "Walmart DVD
6 Rentals" service, which was available on www.walmart.com. While its financials are not publicly
7 reported by Wal-Mart Stores, Walmart.com is ranked as the 14th largest online retailer in the United
8 States. Through the website, www.walmart.com, Walmart.com sells DVDs directly to consumers
9 nationwide. Consumers who purchase DVDs via www.walmart.com may have them either mailed or
10 otherwise delivered to them directly, or may pick them up at a Wal-Mart Stores retail location via
11 Walmart.com's and Wal-Mart Stores' "Site to Store" program.

12 **16. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com.** Walmart.com and Wal-Mart Stores are, in essence,
13 completely integrated and operated as a single commercial enterprise and hold themselves out to the
14 public as such, by which Walmart.com is an internet sales channel for Wal-Mart Stores, rather than
15 being an independent business entity. Wal-Mart Stores is the registrant of the www.walmart.com
16 domain name that is used to sell products and services by Walmart.com. Likewise, Wal-Mart Stores is
17 the registrant of www.walmartdvdrentals.com. Wal-Mart Stores' Chief Marketing Officer John
18 Fleming has explained the relationship between Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com as follows: "Wal-
19 Mart Stores set up Walmart.com as a separate company with some outside investors, but within six
20 months Wal-Mart Stores bought back the outside interest and Walmart.com; Walmart.com now serves
21 as a 'marketing channel' for Wal-Mart Stores."

22 **17. Wal-Mart Stores' Active Participation in the Conspiracy.** Wal-Mart Stores was actively
23 involved in the conspiracy alleged herein, as alleged more specifically below. For purposes of these
24 allegations, both Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com are active participants in the conspiracy and each
25 is liable for the unlawful conduct alleged herein, with each, among other things, participating in, and
26 benefiting from, the Market Division Agreement. Moreover, Wal-Mart Stores directed, ratified,
27 approved, supported, and otherwise aided and abetted Walmart.com's violations of law.

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1 18. Wal-Mart Stores had a strong incentive to accomplish the Market Division Agreement. In
2 addition to its interests as the 100% owner of Walmart.com, Wal-Mart Stores had further incentive to
3 enter into this Agreement, since it obtains substantial revenues from sales of new DVDs, as well as
4 store traffic resulting in the sales of other goods, which would have been threatened by Netflix's entry
5 into new DVD sales, and which were enhanced by Netflix's promotion of Wal-Mart Stores and
6 Walmart.com through the Market Division Agreement. In a letter submitted to this Court in
7 connection with a prior antitrust case brought against Netflix by other plaintiffs for other alleged
8 violations of law, an assistant general counsel of Wal-Mart Stores, referring specifically to Wal-Mart
9 Stores, wrote of "Wal-Mart's decision to discontinue renting DVDs." Moreover, it was Wal-Mart
10 Stores that announced in part the Market Division Agreement, which identifies Wal-Mart Stores, in the
11 "About" section of the press release. The announcement quoted John Fleming, who was then Chief
12 Marketing Officer of Wal-Mart Stores, regarding the Agreement. It explained that Walmart.com's
13 DVD sales are in fact Wal-Mart Stores' "online movie sales business," and that, more generally, Wal-
14 Mart Stores' "[o]nline merchandise sales are available at www.walmart.com."

15 19. Whenever reference is made in this Complaint to a statement or transaction of any
16 corporation or entity, the allegation means that the corporation or entity acted by or through its
17 directors, members, partners, officers, employees, affiliates, or agents, while engaged in the
18 management, direction, control, or conduct of the corporation's or entity's business and acting within
19 its scope of authority.

20 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

21 20. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 & 1337 and 15
22 U.S.C. §§1-2, 15 & 26.

23 21. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§15, 22 & 26 and pursuant to 28
24 U.S.C. §1391(b), (c) & (d), because at all times relevant to the Complaint: (a) Defendants transacted
25 business, were found, or acted through subsidiaries or agents present in this District; (b) a substantial
26 part of Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this District; and (c) a substantial portion of the affected interstate
27 trade and commerce described below has been carried out in this District.

1 22. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because, *inter alia*, each of the
2 Defendants is headquartered in this State or has transacted business; maintained continuous and
3 systemic contacts; purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business; and committed acts in
4 furtherance of the alleged conspiracy in this State.

5 **INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT**

6 23. Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-2, this case should be assigned to the San Francisco Division
7 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred within this division. Plaintiff
8 Andrea Resnick resides in San Francisco County and Defendant Walmart.com is headquartered in San
9 Mateo County.

10 **INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE**

11 24. Defendants' conduct has taken place within the flow of, and substantially affected the
12 interstate commerce of, the United States. By way of example, Defendants have sold and/or rented
13 DVDs throughout the United States, involving hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in interstate
14 commerce, and used the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including interstate wires and the
15 U.S. mail, to sell and/or to rent DVDs throughout the United States.

16 **RELEVANT MARKET**

17 25. Defendants' market allocation conspiracy is *per se* illegal and requires no allegation of
18 market definition.

19 26. For those claims that may require market definition, the Relevant Market for purposes of
20 these allegations during the Class Period at least is: the Online DVD Rental Market in the United
21 States.

22 27. "DVD," as defined herein, refers to a Digital Video Disc or Blu-ray Disc containing
23 commercially recorded entertainment programs for personal viewing. DVDs are the primary medium
24 by which movies and other recorded entertainment are distributed in the United States. Revenues on
25 DVDs far exceed those generated from box office receipts. In addition, DVDs have become a
26 particularly lucrative means for the distribution of previously aired television programs, surpassing
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1 even television syndication rights as a revenue stream in many instances. As defined herein, "DVD"

1 even television syndication rights as a revenue stream in many instances. As defined herein, "DVD"
2 does not refer to blank Digital Video Discs, which are used to store or record data.

3 28. The relevant market is for the rental of DVDs online by subscription for delivery by mail
4 ("Online DVD Rental Market"). At all relevant times, there have been no reasonably interchangeable
5 substitutes for this service, which is differentiated, from both the demand and the supply side, from
6 other methods of DVD distribution channels, as well as other methods of entertainment content
7 delivery.

8 29. In the Online DVD Rental Market, for a monthly subscription fee, a consumer may rent
9 DVDs from an online service provider, such as Netflix, Blockbuster Online, or (prior to May 19, 2005)
10 Walmart DVD Rentals. There are no late fees and no due dates, but, within any given plan, the
11 consumer pays the subscription fee regardless of how many DVDs he or she rents per month. Thus,
12 even a consumer who does not rent a DVD for months still is charged the subscription fee; Netflix
13 CEO Reed Hastings calls this the "gym membership effect."

14 30. To rent DVDs, consumers fill out a rental "queue" in their online profile, listing in order of
15 preference the DVDs they wish to rent. The DVDs are then sent by the provider to the consumer's
16 home via U.S. mail. To return the DVD and receive the next DVD in the queue, the consumer inserts
17 the DVD in a prepaid envelope provided with the rental and mails it back; the service provider then
18 mails the next movie on the list to the consumer. The library of titles available from online service
19 providers has grown over time, now ranging near 100,000 DVDs—often twenty to one-hundred times
20 the selection of titles stocked (not to mention available) at any single video rental store.

21 31. From the consumer's perspective, online DVD rentals are a differentiated service that is not
22 reasonably interchangeable with traditional bricks-and-mortar video rental. In traditional video rental
23 from physical stores, consumers drive to or otherwise arrive at the store, find (or do not find) what they
24 are looking for, and pay on a per-DVD basis for their selection(s). After the designated rental period
25 of one or more days, usually depending upon the release date of the DVD, the consumer returns his
26 selection or potentially incurs late fees. During the Class Period as alleged herein, these late fees have

1 accounted for as much as 20% of the revenues in traditional video rental stores; there are no late fees
2 or due dates in the Online DVD Rental Market.

3 32. There are numerous other practical indicia of the Online DVD Rental Market being a
4 relevant product market, distinct from other forms of DVD rental, including:

5 a. **Price Competition.** No direct price competition exists between online rental and other
6 forms of DVD rental, whether in-store, kiosk, or video downloading, which are not
7 reasonably interchangeable with online DVD rental. For example, online DVD rentals
8 generally are priced on a monthly subscription basis. Within any given plan, the
9 subscription rate is independent of the number of DVDs the customer actually rents in a
10 month. In-store DVD rentals, kiosks, and downloading generally are priced on a pay-
11 per-view basis. Also, changes in the price of online rentals do not closely track changes
12 in the price of in-store rentals. The pricing of online rentals is generally nationwide in
13 scope and is not affected by local in-store prices and competition. As a result, the
14 pricing of online rentals would generally be the same to a customer, regardless of
15 whether the nearest rental store is two minutes or two hours away. Online rentals
16 generally offer additional services, such as movie reviews, customer-specific
17 recommendations based on viewing and preference history, and other metrics of
18 popularity. The cross-elasticity of demand between these products is such that a small
19 but significant non transitory increase in price ("SSNIP") would not cause consumers to
20 switch from online rental to in-store rental or any other arguable method of DVD
21 distribution and *vice versa*.

22 b. **Functional Differences.** Online rentals fundamentally differ from in-store rentals in
23 that (1) they do not require travel to a store (including a second trip to return the DVD
24 and potentially multiple trips if the store does not have the DVD in stock at the right
25 time), (2) are available to anyone with a postal address, regardless of proximity to a
26 store, (3) are primarily subscription-based services, and (4) provide a much wider
27 selection of titles than can a brick-and-mortar store. For these reasons, among others,

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1 Online and in-store DVD rentals are not reasonably interchangeable. Likewise, other
2 modes of content distribution, such as kiosk, video-on-demand, and downloading,
3 among other forms, are not reasonably interchangeable with online DVD rentals for a
4 number of reasons, including relative selection and convenience for consumers, pricing,
5 as well as, from the supply perspective, licensing considerations and technological
6 limitations.

7 c. **Public and Industry Perceptions.** The online rental market is recognized as a distinct
8 market by the public and the industry, including by Defendants.

9 d. **Admissions.** By word and deed, Defendants have confirmed and recognized the
10 existence of a discrete online rental market. Admissions of a discrete online rental
11 market abound from Netflix and Walmart.com and Wal-Mart Stores executives alike,
12 including Hastings and Fleming. Very recently, a Netflix executive told the Wall Street
13 Journal that other types of rental services, such as kiosk and in-store rentals, do not
14 present a direct competitive threat to Netflix. That same executive acknowledged that
15 while video downloads may be a competitive force in the future, DVD will be the
16 dominant medium for years to come, making the entry of this technology not timely
17 enough to be considered a competitive force in the relevant market. Netflix CEO Reed
18 Hastings has observed that the competitive threat of internet downloading to online
19 DVD rental during the Class Period is like that of hydrogen powered cars to gasoline
20 powered cars—inconsequential for many years to come. He has further explained that
21 DVDs will be the dominant medium for movies for perhaps as long as the gasoline
22 engine.

23 33. Online DVD rentals are also a separate market from DVD sales. The pricing of DVD sales
24 and online DVD rentals is very different. For example, the price to buy a new DVD depends heavily
25 on how popular it is, including whether it is a new release or how successful the title originally was at
26 the box office or on television. By contrast, online DVD renters generally charge based on a
27 subscription fee, regardless of whether the consumer is renting popular or obscure DVDs. The
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1 industry and the public perceive online DVD rentals as separate from DVD sales, whether in-store or
2 online. The factors motivating a consumer to buy a DVD are different from those that lead to renting a
3 DVD. The former generally applies to DVDs that the consumer intends to view (either personally, or
4 their family or friends) numerous times. The latter generally applies to DVDs that the consumer
5 intends to view once and then return. DVDs sold at retail have other distinguishing characteristics,
6 such as packaging and special features not available with rentals, which are delivered unadorned in
7 envelopes. In addition, the fact of whether a DVD is new or used is not an issue in rental, but is a
8 significant factor in sales, for used DVDs are sold at a significant discount to their new counterparts,
9 due to them being relatively less desirable to consumers. DVD sales and online rentals also are not
10 reasonably interchangeable for consumers intending to collect physical DVDs or to give a DVD as a
11 gift. The cross-elasticity of demand between these products is such that a SSNIP would not cause
12 consumers to switch from online renting to purchasing DVDs and *vice versa*.

13 34. The Geographic Market for the Online DVD Rental Market is the United States. The
14 practical reality is that, among other things, shipping costs and transglobal differences in DVD data
15 encoding make it neither practical nor feasible for entities located in other countries to rent DVDs to
16 U.S. consumers.

17 **MARKET AND MONOPOLY POWER**

18 35. At all relevant times, Netflix dominated the Online DVD Rental Market. Netflix has an
19 approximate market share of 75% in the Online DVD Rental Market, and is far and away the market
20 leader in the Online DVD Rental Market. As a result of this market share, Netflix has had and
21 continues to have market and monopoly power in the Online DVD Rental Market; it has the power to
22 control prices or exclude competition in this Relevant Market.

23 36. Netflix's market and monopoly power is strengthened by the significant barriers to entry in
24 this market. There have been no significant market entrants in the more than three years since
25 announcement of the Market Division Agreement, which increased those barriers. Online DVD rental
26 is highly capital intensive. A firm must operate on a large scale to be successful. It requires the
27 possession of a significant number of shipping facilities strategically located throughout the United

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1 States to ensure timely delivery. It also requires stocking an extensive inventory of DVDs to maintain
2 the selection of titles that consumers demand. As Netflix CEO Reed Hastings has observed, "When
3 you think about the barriers to entry to this business, it is subtle because it appears easy. A kid can
4 open a website. But the barriers to profitability are very large."

5 37. Since the implementation of the Market Division Agreement, the Online DVD Rental
6 Market has been overwhelmingly comprised of only two firms: Netflix and Blockbuster, which
7 possesses nearly all of the remaining 25% of the Online DVD Rental Market that Netflix does not
8 control. A few minor firms have shares of less than 1-2% of the market. During fiscal years 2005-
9 2007 combined, Netflix earned nearly \$4 Billion in revenues and \$1.3 Billion in gross profit from
10 renting DVDs to consumers—a margin of more than 33%. As a result of Netflix's abuse of its
11 monopoly power alleged herein, its subscription fees have been higher than they otherwise would have
12 been.

13 38. Wal-Mart Stores and its wholly-owned subsidiary Walmart.com combined have an
14 industry-leading 40% of domestic DVD retail sales. During fiscal years 2005-2008 combined, they
15 earned revenues in excess of \$25 Billion by selling DVDs to consumers. Both Wal-Mart Stores and
16 Walmart.com benefit from the Market Division Agreement.

17 39. Further evidence of Netflix's market and monopoly power is reflected in the
18 anticompetitive effects alleged herein.

19 **THE ILLEGAL AGREEMENT**

20 40. **Pre-Agreement Competition in the Online DVD Rental Market.** In early 2005, Netflix
21 was coming off a year in which competition was growing and its stock price had dropped
22 precipitously. It faced increasing competition from Walmart DVD Rentals and from Blockbuster
23 Online, the latter of which had just entered the online rental market.

24 41. By mid-2004, Netflix was charging \$21.99 for its most popular subscription rental plan.
25 Blockbuster entered the online market in earnest in August, at first charging \$19.99 but then reducing
26 its price in November to \$17.49 for its similar plan. After that, the Walmart DVD Rentals rate was
27 reduced from \$18.86 to \$17.36. In the wake of these price cuts, Netflix reduced its prices by nearly

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1 20% (to \$17.99 per month) soon thereafter. After that, Blockbuster further decreased its price to
2 \$14.99—20% below Netflix's already reduced price and more than 40% below the price Netflix was
3 charging just months earlier.

4 42. Meanwhile, Wal-Mart Stores and its wholly-owned subsidiary Walmart.com, which had
5 established themselves as the leader in new DVD sales, were facing increasing competition from in-
6 store and online channels of distribution in new DVD sales, including competition from Amazon.com.
7 At the time, Netflix was a significant potential additional competitor, since it had a subscriber base of
8 millions of customers who were known in the industry to be prolific DVD buyers, and the sales and
9 profits of Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com stood to suffer if Netflix began selling new DVDs to
10 these customers. Conversely, Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com stood to gain significant additional
11 sales and profits and to gain further market share in the sale of new DVDs if these customers were to
12 make their purchases of new DVDs from them instead.

13 43. **The Walmart Price Cut.** On January 7, 2005, Walmart DVD Rentals dropped the price on
14 its most popular DVD rental plan significantly—to \$12.97 per month—creating further price pressure
15 on Netflix to reduce its DVD rental prices. In order to respond to the increased competition, Netflix
16 would have been forced to lower its prices and thereby reduce its profits.

17 44. **The January Dinner Meeting.** Faced with this increasing competition, Reed Hastings, the
18 Chairman and CEO of Netflix, called John Fleming, then the CEO of Walmart.com, and invited him to
19 dinner to discuss the their companies' DVD sales and rentals businesses. Fleming accepted the
20 invitation; the two met together in January 2005 and embarked upon a scheme that would result in the
21 contract combination, and conspiracy, and agreement reflected in the Market Division Agreement.

22 45. **Hastings' Subsequent "Prediction."** On May 5, 2005, in Netflix's First Quarter earnings
23 call with financial analysts, held after the January dinner but only two weeks prior to the public
24 announcement of the Market Division Agreement, Hastings made plain the motive for Netflix to
25 conspire with Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com:

26 In terms of profitability over the coming years, the key issue is the number of major
27 competitors. If there are only two major players, Blockbuster and Netflix, the
28 profitability may be substantial like other two-firm entertainment markets. If, on the
other hand, Amazon, Wal-Mart, Blockbuster and Netflix are all major competitors in

1 online rental, then the profits would likely be small.

2 Hastings went on to "predict" on that conference call:

3 [T]he likely case is [that] online rental becomes a two-firm market over the coming
4 years.

5 **46. The Public Announcement.** On May 19, 2005, shortly after Fleming had been promoted
6 to Chief Marketing Officer of Wal-Mart Stores, Defendants issued a joint press release that revealed
7 the existence of the Market Division Agreement, by which they unlawfully divided and allocated the
8 markets for DVD sales and rentals, and did, in fact, create the two-firm market that Hastings sought.

9 **47. The Media's Reaction.** The news of the agreement was featured in a number of
10 newspapers and other publications, in articles with aptly colorful titles, such as:

- 11 • "Wal-Mart and Netflix Scratch Each Other's Backs,"
- 12 • "Truce in DVD-Rental Wars,"
- 13 • "Wal-Mart and Netflix: An Alliance," and
- 14 • "Wal-Mart Loves Netflix: And Vice-Versa."

15 **48. The Execution.** Beginning on May 19, 2005, Walmart.com, as agreed, did in fact exit the
16 online rental business. Walmart.com announced to all of the subscribers to "Walmart DVD Rentals"
17 that it was exiting the online DVD rental business and that those subscribers could be transferred to
18 Netflix. Walmart.com took additional steps to affirmatively implement the Market Division
19 Agreement by adding a prominently placed link to the Netflix website to encourage customers to
20 transfer their subscriptions to Netflix. Since the date of their joint announcement on May 19, 2005
21 (apart from the 30 days that Walmart.com used to wind down its existing online rental business),
22 neither Walmart.com nor Wal-Mart Stores has participated in the Online DVD Rental Market, and
23 Netflix has not sold new DVDs.

24 **49.** As a result of the Market Division Agreement, downward pricing pressure from
25 Walmart.com was eliminated and the Online DVD Rental Market was reduced to two competitors.
26 Absent the Market Division Agreement, Netflix would have lowered its prices no later than May 19,
27 2005. As a result of the elimination of a competitor in this Relevant Market, Blockbuster was able to

1 raise its subscription price in July to match that of Netflix, from \$14.99 per month to \$17.99 per
2 month, in accord with Hastings' expectation that "[i]f there are only two major players, Blockbuster
3 and Netflix, the profitability may be substantial like other two-firm entertainment markets." In
4 Netflix's next earnings call, on August 8, 2005, Hastings boasted:

5 Last quarter we said online rental was shaping up to be a two-player market, and that is
6 indeed what is happening.

7 50. The Market Division Agreement was not in the independent self-interest of Wal-Mart
8 Stores, Walmart.com, or Netflix. Neither Wal-Mart Stores nor Walmart.com would have wanted
9 Walmart.com to withdraw from the online rental market, encourage its subscribers to be transferred to
10 Netflix, and promote Netflix's rental business absent substantial consideration from Netflix, such as an
11 agreement not to compete for new DVD retail sales. But for the Market Division Agreement,
12 Walmart.com would not have exited the Online DVD Rental Market when it did. Likewise, Netflix
13 would not have foreclosed its opportunity to sell DVDs to its millions of subscribers—a base of
14 customers who purchase on average 25 DVDs per year each—and would not have promoted new DVD
15 sales by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com, rather than its own sales, absent an agreement from them
16 not to compete against Netflix's online rental business.

17 ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

18 51. Defendants' illegal acts and practices have caused anticompetitive effects in the Online
19 DVD Rental Market. The subscription fees charged by Netflix to Plaintiffs, as well as the other
20 members of the Class, were maintained at artificially high and supracompetitive levels. Plaintiffs and
21 the other members of the Class paid higher subscription prices to Netflix than they otherwise would
22 have paid.

23 52. The Market Division Agreement (i) eliminated one of only three significant competitors in
24 the Relevant Market, (ii) eliminated competition between Defendants, and (iii) enabled Netflix to
25 acquire market power and also acquire and maintain monopoly power in the Relevant Market. The
26 Market Division Agreement has enabled Netflix to implement monopolistic and supracompetitive
27 pricing in the Relevant Market.

53. The Market Division Agreement and Defendants' acts and practices in furtherance thereof have no procompetitive benefits. They do not create information that consumers need, nor do they create new or better products or services. Rather, they have served to reinforce the true anticompetitive nature of the Market Division Agreement by assuring, for example, that Walmart.com not only withdrew from the Online DVD Rental Market, but further enhanced Netflix's position in that market. Even if there were any such benefits, they would not outweigh any of the anticompetitive effects described herein, and, in any event, could be achieved by less restrictive means.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

54. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and as class actions under Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23 (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all members of the Class, as defined herein.

55. Bunker, Haley, Latham, Resnick, Roslansky, and Simpson bring this action on behalf of themselves and the members of the Class, defined as comprising:

Any person in the United States that paid a subscription fee to Netflix to rent DVDs, on or after May 19, 2005 up to the present. Excluded from the Class are government entities, Defendants, their co-conspirators and their representatives, parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates.

56. The Class numbers in the millions, the exact number and identities of the members being known by Defendants.

57. The Class is so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members is impracticable.

58. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class and the members thereof. These common questions relate to the existence of the conspiracy alleged, and to the type and common pattern of injuries sustained as a result thereof. The questions include, but are not limited to:

- a. Whether Defendants engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy to allocate markets;
- b. Whether Defendants unreasonably restrained trade in the Online DVD Rental Market;

- c. Whether Defendants had the specific intent for Netflix to monopolize the Online DVD Rental Market;
- d. The nature and character of the acts performed by Defendants in the furtherance of the alleged contract, combination, and conspiracy;
- e. Whether the alleged contract, combination, and conspiracy violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act;
- f. Whether the alleged contract, combination, and conspiracy violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act;
- g. The anticompetitive effects of Defendants' violations of law;
- h. Whether Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole; and
- i. Whether the conduct of Defendants, as alleged in this Complaint, caused Netflix subscription fees to be higher than they otherwise would have been and thereby caused injury to the business and property of Plaintiffs and other members of the Class.

59. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including the legal and factual issues relating to liability and damages.

60. Bunker, Haley, Latham, Resnick, Roslansky, and Simpson are members of the Class. Their claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, and they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Their interests are aligned with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the Class.

61. Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel experienced in class action antitrust litigation.

62. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class treatment will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by members of the Class who otherwise could not afford to litigate antitrust claims such as are asserted in this Complaint. This class action presents no difficulties of management that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

ANTITRUST INJURY AND STANDING

63. During the Class Period, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have directly paid monthly DVD subscription fees to Netflix in the United States, and many continue to do so.

64. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have suffered, and many continue to suffer, injury of the type that the antitrust laws are designed to punish and prevent. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have paid, and many continue to pay, more to subscribe to Netflix than they would have, absent the Market Division Agreement. As a direct and proximate result of the unreasonable restraint of trade and market and monopoly power created by the Market Division Agreement, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class were, and many continue to be, injured and financially damaged in their businesses and property, in amounts that are not presently determined. As the direct victims of Defendants' antitrust violations, Plaintiffs are the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust claims made herein.

COUNT ONE

SHERMAN ACT SECTION ONE (15 U.S.C. §1)

**Illegal Market Division
(Against All Defendants)**

65. Plaintiffs reallege each allegation set forth above, as if fully set forth herein.

66. Defendants have entered into a *per se* illegal market division agreement, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. Even if evaluated under the Rule of Reason, the Market Division Agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1.

67. Prior to and at the time of the agreement, Netflix and Walmart.com were actual competitors in the Online DVD Rental Market. In addition, Netflix, on the one hand, and Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com, on the other hand, were potential competitors in new DVD sales. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com were actual participants and Netflix was a potential participant, with the means and economic incentive to sell new DVDs—in the absence of the Market Division Agreement.

68. Defendants shared a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve the unlawful objective of dividing the markets for online DVD rentals and new DVD sales. The Market

1 Division Agreement allocated the Online DVD Rental Market to Netflix, with Wal-Mart Stores and
 2 Walmart.com agreeing not to compete in that Relevant Market. The agreement also allocated new
 3 DVD sales to Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com, with Netflix agreeing to refrain from selling new
 4 DVDs in competition with them. In addition to explicitly or *de facto* agreeing not to sell new DVDs,
 5 Netflix also obtained the Market Division Agreement by providing potentially valuable promotion to
 6 Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com. In so doing, Netflix provided significant consideration to Wal-
 7 Mart Stores and Walmart.com for their agreement that Walmart.com would withdraw from, and both
 8 Walmart.com and Wal-Mart Stores would not compete in, the Online DVD Rental Market.

9 69. The Market Division Agreement has created significant anticompetitive effects and no pro-
 10 competitive benefits. It eliminated competition in the Relevant Market, raising prices paid by
 11 consumers. To the extent that there are any procompetitive benefits at all resulting from the
 12 agreement, they would not outweigh the agreement's anticompetitive effects. In any event, to the
 13 extent that there were any, they could have been achieved by less restrictive means.

14 70. As a result of this violation of law, Netflix's subscription prices charged to, and paid by,
 15 Plaintiffs and the Class are, and have been, higher than they otherwise would have been.

16 **COUNT TWO**

17 **SHERMAN ACT SECTION TWO (15 U.S.C. §2)** 18 **Monopolization of Online DVD Rental Market** 19 **(Against Netflix)**

20 71. Plaintiffs reallege each allegation set forth above, as if fully set forth herein.

21 72. Netflix has monopoly power in the Online DVD Rental Market.

22 73. Netflix willfully acquired and maintained its monopoly in the Online DVD Rental Market
 23 by its acts and practices described herein, including by executing, implementing, and otherwise
 24 complying with the Market Division Agreement, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
 Act, 15 U.S.C. §2.

25 74. As a result of this violation of law, Netflix's subscription prices charged to, and paid by,
 26 Plaintiffs and the Class are, and have been, higher than they otherwise would have been.

COUNT THREE

**SHERMAN ACT SECTION TWO (15 U.S.C. §2)
Attempt to Monopolize Online DVD Rental Market
(Against Netflix)**

75. Plaintiffs reallege each allegation set forth above, as if fully set forth herein.

76. If Netflix does not already have monopoly power, then Netflix has a dangerous probability of success in achieving monopoly power in the Online DVD Rental Market.

77. With the specific intent to achieve a monopoly, Netflix, by its acts and practices described herein, including by executing, implementing, and otherwise complying with the Market Division Agreement, has attempted to monopolize the Online DVD Rental Market, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2.

78. As a result of this violation of law, Netflix's subscription prices charged to, and paid by, Plaintiffs and the Class are, and have been, higher than they otherwise would have been.

COUNT FOUR

**SHERMAN ACT SECTION TWO (15 U.S.C. §2)
Conspiracy to Monopolize Online DVD Rental Market
(Against All Defendants)**

79. Plaintiffs reallege each allegation set forth above, as if fully set forth herein.

80. Defendants shared a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve the unlawful objective of the monopolization of the Online DVD Rental Market. Prior to and at the time of the agreement, Netflix and Walmart.com were actual competitors in the Online DVD Rental Market. Defendants conspired with the specific intent, knowledge and purpose that their anticompetitive agreement would result in Netflix willfully acquiring and maintaining a monopoly in the Relevant Market. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com knew that the natural and probable consequence of the Market Division Agreement would be the monopolization of the Relevant Market by Netflix. Defendants have committed overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy, including entering into, complying with, and implementing the Market Division Agreement, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2.

81. As a result of this violation of law, Netflix's subscription prices charged to, and paid by,

1 Plaintiffs and the Class are, and have been, higher than they otherwise would have been.

2 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

3 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that:

- 4 A. The Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class action under
5 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiffs be appointed
6 class representatives, and that Plaintiffs' counsel be appointed as counsel for the
7 Class.
- 8 B. Defendants be adjudged to violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
9 of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2.
- 10 C. The Court declare the Market Division Agreement between Defendants
11 announced May 19, 2005, to be unlawful and null and void.
- 12 D. Judgment be entered for Plaintiffs and the members of the Class against
13 Defendants, jointly and severally, for three times the amount of damages
14 sustained by Plaintiff and the Class, under Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act
15 of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §15, together with the costs of the action, including
16 reasonable attorneys' fees, and such other relief as is appropriate.
- 17 E. Defendants, their affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees, and the officers,
18 directors, partners, agents and employees thereof, and all other persons acting or
19 claiming to act on their behalf, be permanently enjoined and restrained from, in
20 any manner, continuing, maintaining or renewing the contract, combination or
21 conspiracy alleged herein, or from engaging in any other contract, combination
22 or conspiracy having similar purpose or effect, and from adopting or following
23 any practice, plan, program or device having a similar purpose or effect,
24 pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §29.
- 25 F. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have such other, further, and different
26 relief as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper under the
27 circumstances.
- 28


JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of all issues triable by jury.

Dated: January 2, 2009

Respectfully submitted,

By:


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EXHIBIT B

ORIGINAL
FILED

JAN 12 2009

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MEJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CV 09 0139

JONATHAN GROCE AND SUSAN
HOROWITZ ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES
AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Case No. _____

Plaintiff,
vs.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

NETFLIX, INC., WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
and WALMART.COM USA LLC

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant.

1 Plaintiffs Jonathan Groce and Susan Horowitz, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
2 situated (the "Class", defined below), bring this action under the federal antitrust laws against the above-
3 captioned Defendants. Plaintiffs make the following allegations on information and belief, except as to
4 those paragraphs that pertain to Plaintiffs, which are based on personal knowledge. Plaintiffs'
5 information and belief are based upon, *inter alia*, the investigation conducted by their attorneys.

6 NATURE OF THE ACTION

7 1. On or about May 19, 2005, Netflix, Inc. ("Netflix"), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart
8 Stores"), and Walmart.com USA LLC ("Walmart.com"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Wal-Mart
9 Stores, entered into a contract, combination, and conspiracy (the "Market Division Agreement") to
10 divide and allocate the market for the online rentals of Digital Video Discs ("DVDs") and for the sale of
11 new DVDs in the United States. The purpose and effect of Defendants' illegal conduct and agreement
12 was to divide and allocate the market, and to monopolize and unreasonably restrain trade for online
13 DVD rentals.

14 2. The meetings that culminated in the illegal agreement began in early 2005, when the
15 CEO of Netflix and the then CEO of Walmart.com met to discuss the online DVD rental business and
16 the new DVD sales business. The CEOs wanted to discuss ways in which they could reduce or
17 eliminate competition and thereby increase their profits. Reed Hastings, the CEO of Netflix, having
18 "noticed how low Wal-Mart's prices [for DVDs] were," has admitted that he "called the CEO [of
19 Walmart.com] in January and asked if he could have dinner." John Fleming, then the CEO of
20 Walmart.com, who reported directly to Wal-Mart Stores' CEO Lee Scott, accepted Hastings' invitation.
21 As a result of this dinner meeting, as well as other meetings and exchanges, Defendants entered into the
22 contract, combination, and conspiracy alleged here.

23 3. At the time of their initial meeting and prior to entering into to the Market Division
24 Agreement, Netflix and Walmart.com were direct competitors in the online rental DVD market and were
25 potential competitors in selling new DVDs to customers. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com were
26 already selling new DVDs and Netflix was preparing to enter that market. No later than May 19, 2005
27 however, Netflix, Wal-Mart Stores, and Walmart.com entered into an agreement whereby Walmart.com
28 would stop competing with Netflix in the online DVD rental market, and in return, Netflix would

1 promote the sales of new DVDs by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com. Netflix also agreed not to sell
2 new DVDs that would have been in direct competition with Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com.

3 4. Wal-Mart Stores actively participated in this conspiracy. This is confirmed by, among
4 other things, the fact that prior to the announcement of the Market Division Agreement, John Fleming
5 was promoted to Chief Marketing Officer of Wal-Mart Stores. As of the time of the announcement of
6 the Market Division Agreement, Fleming was acting in his capacity both as the Chief Marketing Officer
7 of Wal-Mart Stores and the Wal-Mart Stores executive responsible for overseeing the operations of
8 Walmart.com. As Chief Marketing Officer of Wal-Mart Stores, Fleming was responsible for deciding
9 "what the largest, most powerful retailer in history will stock on its shelves, and how much those
10 products will cost. Such decisions, when made at Wal-Mart, can help make or break entire industries."

11 5. As a result of the Defendants' contract, combination, and conspiracy, as well as Netflix's
12 unlawfully acquired and maintained market and monopoly power, Netflix was able to charge its
13 customers higher subscription prices for the rental of DVDs than it otherwise would have been able to
14 charge.

15 6. Under the Market Division Agreement, Netflix, Wal-Mart Stores, and Walmart.com
16 agreed that they would restrain trade and eliminate competition. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com
17 agreed that Walmart.com would stop competing with Netflix in the online DVD rental market and
18 Netflix agreed that it would not sell new DVDs and instead would promote the DVD sales of Wal-Mart
19 Stores and Walmart.com. In agreeing to promote the sale of DVDs by Wal-Mart Stores and
20 Walmart.com, Netflix provided consideration for the agreement by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com
21 to exit the online DVD rental market and simultaneously confirmed to Wal-Mart Stores and
22 Walmart.com that Netflix would not enter the market to sell new DVDs. Netflix was well-positioned to
23 enter the new DVD sales market, and had the unilateral economic incentive to do so, but refrained from
24 doing so as a result of the Market Division Agreement. Since entering into the Market Division
25 Agreement, neither Wal-Mart Stores nor Walmart.com has rented DVDs online and Netflix has not sold
26 new DVDs. The Market Division Agreement served to entrench and enhance Defendants' dominant
27 market positions and otherwise harmed competition, by, among other things, enabling Netflix to charge
28 higher subscription prices for online DVD rentals than it would have charged had it not entered into the

1 agreement. In fact, Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated customers paid the higher subscription
2 prices to Netflix than they otherwise would have paid.

3 7. As alleged below, this case is brought as a class action on behalf of all persons in the
4 United States who, during the period May 19, 2005 to the present (hereinafter, the "Class Period"), paid
5 a subscription fee to rent DVDs from Netflix. Plaintiffs bring this action under Sections 4 and 16 of the
6 Clayton Antitrust Act to seek redress in the form of treble damages and other relief for their injuries
7 resulting from Defendants' violations of law on behalf of themselves and other similarly injured persons
8 nationwide and to seek a declaration that the Market Division Agreement is null and void.

9 **PLAINTIFFS**

10 8. Jonathan Groce ("Groce") is an individual customer who resides in Brooklyn, New York.
11 During the Class Period, Groce directly subscribed to Netflix for his personal, non-commercial use. The
12 subscription fees he paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than he would have paid, but for the
13 antitrust violations alleged here.

14 9. Susan Horowitz ("Horowitz") is an individual customer who resides in Montclair, New
15 Jersey. During the Class Period, Horowitz directly subscribed to Netflix for her personal, non-
16 commercial use. The subscription fees she paid to Netflix for renting DVDs were greater than she
17 would have paid, but for the antitrust violations alleged here.

18 **DEFENDANTS**

19 10. Defendant Netflix is a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its headquarters located
20 at 100 Winchester Circle, Los Gatos, California, 95032. Netflix' revenues exceed \$1 billion annually.
21 Netflix, through the internet, rents DVDs directly to customers nationwide by charging monthly
22 subscription fees, which entitle customers to rent DVDs pursuant to various subscription plans. At all
23 times during the Class Period, Netflix has had a market share of at least 75% of the online DVD rental
24 market in the United States, as defined here.

25 11. Defendant Wal-Mart Stores is the largest retailer in the United States. Wal-Mart Stores is
26 a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its headquarters located at 702 S.W. 8th Street, Bentonville,
27 Arkansas, 72716. Wal-Mart Stores' revenues are approximately \$400 billion annually. Through its
28 retail stores and the internet, Wal-Mart Stores sells DVDs directly to customers nationwide. Wal-Mart

1 Stores sells far more DVDs than any other retailer in the United States, accounting for about 40% of all
2 new DVDs sold to customers domestically. Prior to the Market Division Agreement, Wal-Mart Stores'
3 wholly-owned subsidiary Walmart.com competed with Netflix in the online DVD rental market through
4 the "Walmart DVD Rentals" service, which was available on www.walmart.com.

5 12. Defendant Walmart.com is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores.
6 Walmart.com is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters located at 7000 Marina Boulevard,
7 Brisbane, California, 94005. It is the online component of Wal-Mart Stores' retail empire that is the
8 leading seller of new DVDs in the United States. Prior to the conspiracy alleged here, Walmart.com was
9 also a major competitor of Netflix in the online DVD rental market through the "Walmart DVD Rentals"
10 service, which was available on www.walmart.com. While its financials are not publicly reported by
11 Wal-Mart Stores, Walmart.com is ranked as the 14th largest online retailer in the United States. Through
12 the website www.walmart.com, Walmart.com sells DVDs directly to customers nationwide. Customers
13 who purchase DVDs via www.walmart.com may have them either mailed or otherwise delivered to
14 them directly, or may pick them up at a Wal-Mart Stores retail location via Walmart.com's and Wal-
15 Mart Stores' "Site to Store" program.

16 13. Walmart.com is the internet sales channel for Wal-Mart Stores, rather than an
17 independent business entity. They are, in essence, completely integrated, operating as a single
18 commercial enterprise and holding themselves out as such to the public. Wal-Mart Stores is the
19 registrant of the www.walmart.com domain name that is used to sell products and services by
20 Walmart.com. Likewise, Wal-Mart Stores is the registrant of www.walmartdvdrentals.com. Wal-Mart
21 Stores' Chief Marketing Officer John Fleming explained the relationship between Wal-Mart Stores and
22 Walmart.com as follows: "Wal-Mart Stores set up Walmart.com as a separate company with some
23 outside investors, but within six months Wal-Mart Stores bought back the outside interest and
24 Walmart.com; Walmart.com now serves as a 'marketing channel' for Wal-Mart Stores."

25 14. Wal-Mart Stores was actively involved in the conspiracy alleged here. For purposes of
26 these allegations, both Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com are active participants in the conspiracy and
27 each is liable for the unlawful conduct alleged here, with each, among other things, participating in, and
28

1 benefiting from, the Market Division Agreement. Moreover, Wal-Mart Stores directed, ratified,
2 approved, supported, and otherwise aided and abetted Walmart.com's violations of law.

3 15. Wal-Mart Stores had a strong incentive to accomplish the Market Division Agreement.
4 In addition to its interests as the 100% owner of Walmart.com, Wal-Mart Stores had further incentive to
5 enter into this Agreement, since it obtains substantial revenues from sales of new DVDs, as well as in-
6 store traffic resulting in the sales of other goods. These revenues would have been threatened by
7 Netflix's entry into the market for new DVD sales but instead, they were enhanced by Netflix's
8 promotion of Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com through the Market Division Agreement.

9 16. Whenever reference is made in this Complaint to a statement or transaction of any
10 corporation or entity, the allegation means that the corporation or entity acted by or through its directors,
11 members, partners, officers, employees, affiliates, or agents, while engaged in the management,
12 direction, control, or conduct of the corporation's or entity's business and acting within its scope of
13 authority.

14 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15 17. This action is instituted under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and
16 16, to receive treble damages and costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against the
17 Defendants for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff and the members of the Class by reasons of the
18 violations, as alleged, of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

19 18. This action is also instituted to secure injunctive relief against the Defendants to prevent
20 them from further violations of the antitrust laws.

21 19. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1337 and 15 U.S.C. §§
22 1-2, 15 & 26, as the case arises under the laws of the United States.

23 20. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Sections 4, 12, and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
24 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 & 26 and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) & (d). Venue is proper in this judicial
25 district because during the Class Period the Defendants resided, transacted business, were found, or had
26 agents in this district, and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims
27 occurred, and a substantial portion of the affected interstate trade and commerce described below has
28 been carried out in this District.

1 21. This court has *in personam* jurisdiction over Defendants because they engaged in illegal
2 schemes that were directed at and had the intended effect of causing injury to persons or entities residing
3 in, located in, or doing business throughout the United States.

4 **CO-CONSPIRATORS**

5 22. Various other persons, firms and corporations, not named as a defendant in this
6 Complaint, may have participated as co-conspirators with the Defendants in the violations alleged here,
7 and aided, abetted and performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.

8 **INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT**

9 23. Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-2, this case should be assigned to the San Francisco Division
10 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred within this division.
11 Defendant Walmart.com is headquartered in San Mateo County.

12 **RELEVANT MARKET**

13 24. Defendants' market allocation conspiracy is *per se* illegal and requires no allegation of
14 market definition.

15 25. To the extent applicable to the claims alleged here, the relevant product market is the
16 market for the rental of DVDs online, by subscription, for delivery by mail ("online DVD Rental
17 Market"). The relevant geographic market is the United States and its territories. During the Class
18 Period, Netflix's share of the online DVD rental market in the United States and its territories was
19 approximately 75%.

20 26. DVDs contain commercially recorded entertainment programs for personal viewing,
21 normally movies or previously aired television programs. At all relevant times, there have been no
22 reasonably interchangeable substitutes for the service of online DVD rentals, which is differentiated, on
23 both the demand and the supply side, from other methods of DVD distribution, as well as other methods
24 of entertainment content delivery.

25 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

26 27. In the online DVD Rental Market, in return for a monthly subscription fee, a customer
27 may rent DVDs from an online service provider, such as Netflix, Blockbuster Online, or prior to the
28 Market Division Agreement, Walmart DVD Rentals. The subscription fee determines the number of

1 DVDs customers can rent in a given month and how many DVDs they may rent at one time. Thus,
2 customers with the same subscription plan pay the same amount, irrespective of whether they rent one
3 DVD or more than one DVD in a given month.

4 28. The entire transaction is completed over the internet and through the United States postal
5 service. To rent DVDs, customers log onto a company's website, such as Netflix.com, and select which
6 DVDs they would like to receive. Customers can then rank the DVDs in order of preference. The rental
7 company then ships the DVDs to the customer's home by first class mail. After watching the DVD the
8 customer simply returns it in a prepaid envelope provided by the rental company. Upon receipt the
9 rental company would then mail the next DVD to the customer based on the rankings previously
10 provided by the customer.

11 29. The online DVD rental business is a differentiated service that is not reasonably
12 interchangeable with traditional brick-and-mortar video rental. The traditional brick-and-mortar stores
13 differ in significant respects from online DVD rentals, including the way in which the rentals are priced,
14 and the method for obtaining the rental. In a traditional video rental from physical stores, customers
15 must drive to the store and pay for each DVD rental and potentially pay late fees if the DVD is not
16 returned within a predetermined number of days - usually one to three. In addition, the selection offered
17 by a brick-and-mortar store is significantly smaller than the selection available from an online DVD
18 rental company. Netflix's catalog of DVDs, for example, now includes in excess of 100,000 titles and is
19 continuing to grow.

20 30. Even the Defendants recognize that the online DVD market differs substantially from
21 other methods for renting DVDs. Executives from Netflix and Walmart.com and Wal-Mart Stores
22 executives alike, including Hastings and Fleming, have admitted as such. A Netflix executive stated that
23 other types of rental services, such as kiosk and in-store rentals, do not present a direct competitive
24 threat to Netflix and that while video downloads may be a competitive force in the future, DVD will be
25 the dominant medium for years to come.

26 31. Online DVD rentals are also a separate market from DVD sales. First, the pricing of
27 DVD sales and online DVD rentals is very different. The price to buy a new DVD fluctuates depending
28 on how popular the DVD is, whether it is a new release, and how successful the title originally was at

1 the box office or on television. By contrast, online DVD rental customers are charged a flat subscription
2 fee that does not change regardless which DVD is rented. Second, once customers purchase a DVD it is
3 theirs to keep and do with as they please. An online DVD rental, on the other hand, still belongs to the
4 rental company and must be returned at some point. Third, whether a DVD is new or used is not an
5 issue in the rental market (customers actually expect and understand that they are obtaining a used
6 DVD), but is a significant factor in sales because used DVDs are sold at a significant discount to their
7 new counterparts.

8 MARKET AND MONOPOLY POWER

9 32. At all times during the Class Period, Netflix had monopoly or market power and/or
10 economic power in the relevant online DVD Rental Market. Netflix has a market share of
11 approximately 75% in the online DVD Rental Market, and is the market leader in the online DVD
12 Rental Market. Its closest competitor is Blockbuster Online which controls approximately 20-25% of
13 the market. As a result of its market share, Netflix had and continues to have market and monopoly
14 power because it has the power to control prices and/or exclude competition in the online DVD rental
15 market.

16 33. There are significant barriers to entry that prevent potential rivals from entering and
17 successfully competing in the online DVD rental market, including having a large catalog of DVD titles
18 available to customers and numerous shipping facilities located throughout the United States. These
19 barriers have prevented the entry of new competitors and have forced the withdrawal of some companies
20 who tried to enter the market. As Netflix CEO Reed Hastings observed, “[w]hen you think about the
21 barriers to entry to this business, it is subtle because it appears easy. A kid can open a website. But the
22 barriers to profitability are very large.”

24 34. Since the implementation of the Market Division Agreement, the online DVD Rental
25 Market has been overwhelmingly comprised of only two firms: Netflix and Blockbuster Online
26 (“Blockbuster”). Blockbuster possesses nearly all of the remaining 25% of the online DVD Rental
27 Market that Netflix does not control. A few minor firms have shares of less than 1-2% of the market
28 and the number of these minor firms is dwindling. During fiscal years 2005-2007 combined, Netflix

1 earned nearly \$4 billion in revenues and \$1.3 billion in gross profit from renting DVDs to customers – a
2 margin of more than 33%. As a result of Netflix's anticompetitive agreement and its abuse of its
3 monopoly power alleged here, the subscription fees it charged to customers, including Plaintiffs and the
4 Class, have been higher than they otherwise would have been.

5 35. Wal-Mart Stores and its wholly-owned subsidiary Walmart.com combined have an
6 industry-leading 40% of domestic DVD retail sales. During fiscal years 2005-2008 combined, they
7 earned revenues in excess of \$25 billion by selling DVDs to customers. Both Wal-Mart Stores and
8 Walmart.com benefit from the Market Division Agreement.

9 36. Further evidence of Netflix's market and monopoly power is reflected in the
10 anticompetitive effects alleged here.

11 THE ILLEGAL AGREEMENT

12 37. In early 2005, Netflix faced increasing competition from Walmart DVD Rentals and from
13 Blockbuster Online, the latter of which had just entered the online rental market.

14 38. As a result of new entrants in the online DVD Rental Market, Netflix, in order to remain
15 competitive was required to undertake price cuts. In 2004, Netflix's most popular service cost \$21.99.
16 When Blockbuster entered the online DVD Rental Market at that time, it started charging customers
17 \$19.99 but proceeded to reduce its price in late 2004 to \$17.49. Walmart.com responded to these cuts
18 by lowering the pricing on its most popular plan from \$18.86 to \$17.36. In the wake of these price cuts,
19 Netflix soon reduced its prices by nearly 20% (to \$17.99 per month). After that, Blockbuster further
20 decreased its price to \$14.99 – 20% below Netflix's already reduced price and more than 40% below the
21 price that Netflix had been charging in the beginning of 2004.

22 39. Meanwhile, Wal-Mart Stores and its wholly-owned subsidiary Walmart.com, which had
23 established themselves as the leader in new DVD sales, were facing increasing competition from in-
24 store and online channels of distribution in new DVD sales, including competition from Amazon.com.
25 At the time, Netflix was a significant potential additional competitor, since it had a subscriber base of
26 millions of customers who were known in the industry to be prolific DVD buyers, and the sales and
27 profits of Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com stood to suffer if Netflix began selling new DVDs to these
28 customers. Conversely, Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com stood to gain significant additional sales and

1 profits and to gain further market share in the sale of new DVDs, if these customers were to make their
2 purchases of new DVDs from them instead.

3 40. On January 7, 2005, Walmart DVD Rentals dropped the price on its most popular DVD
4 rental plan significantly – to \$12.97 per month – creating further price pressure on Netflix to reduce its
5 DVD rental prices. In order to respond to the increased competition, Netflix would have been forced to
6 lower its prices even further and thereby reduce its profits.

7 41. Faced with this increased competition, Reed Hastings, the Chairman and CEO of Netflix,
8 called John Fleming, then the CEO of Walmart.com, and invited him to dinner to discuss their
9 companies' DVD sales and rentals business. Fleming accepted the invitation, and during the dinner
10 meeting, the two embarked on a scheme that would eventually result in execution of the illegal Market
11 Division Agreement.

12 42. On May 5, 2005, during Netflix' First Quarter earnings call with financial analysts, held
13 after the January dinner but before to the public announcement of the Market Division Agreement,
14 Hastings made plain the motive for Netflix to conspire with Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com:

15 In terms of profitability over the coming years, **the key issue is the number of major**
16 **competitors.** If there are only two major players, Blockbuster and Netflix, the
17 profitability may be substantial like other two-firm entertainment markets. If, on the other hand,
18 Amazon, Wal-Mart, Blockbuster and Netflix are all major competitors in
19 online rental, then the profits would likely be small.

20 Hastings went on to "predict" that "online rental [would] become[] a two-firm market over the coming
21 years." (Emphasis added.)

22 43. On May 19, 2005, shortly after Fleming had been promoted to Chief Marketing Officer
23 of Wal-Mart Stores, Defendants issued a joint press release that revealed the existence of the Market
24 Division Agreement, by which they unlawfully created the two-firm market that Hastings sought and
25 had "predicted."

26 44. Beginning on May 19, 2005, Walmart.com, as agreed, did in fact exit the online rental
27 business. Walmart.com announced to all of the subscribers to "Walmart DVD Rentals" that it was
28 exiting the online DVD rental business and that those subscribers could be transferred to Netflix.
Walmart.com took additional steps to affirmatively implement the Market Division Agreement by
adding a prominently placed link to the Netflix website to encourage customers to transfer their

1 subscriptions to Netflix. Since the date of their joint announcement on May 19, 2005 (apart from the 30
2 days that Walmart.com used to wind down its existing online rental business), neither Walmart.com nor
3 Wal-Mart Stores has participated in the Online DVD Rental Market, and Netflix has not sold new
4 DVDs.

5 45. As a result of the Market Division Agreement, downward pricing pressure from
6 Walmart.com was eliminated and the Online DVD Rental Market was reduced to two competitors.
7 Absent the Market Division Agreement, Netflix would have lowered its prices no later than May 19,
8 2005. As a result of the elimination of a competitor in this relevant market, Blockbuster was able to
9 raise its subscription price in July to match that of Netflix, from \$14.99 per month to \$17.99 per month,
10 in accordance with Hastings' expectation that "[i]f there are only two major players, Blockbuster and
11 Netflix, the profitability may be substantial like other two-firm entertainment markets." In Netflix's
12 next earnings call, on July 25, 2005, Hastings boasted: "Last quarter we said online rental was shaping
13 up to be a two-player market, and that is indeed what is happening."

14 46. The Market Division Agreement was not in the independent self-interest of Wal-Mart
15 Stores, Walmart.com, or Netflix. Neither Wal-Mart Stores nor Walmart.com would have wanted
16 Walmart.com to withdraw from the online rental market, encourage its subscribers to be transferred to
17 Netflix, and promote Netflix's rental business absent substantial consideration from Netflix, such as an
18 agreement not to compete for new DVD retail sales. But for the Market Division Agreement,
19 Walmart.com would not have exited the online DVD Rental Market when it did. Likewise, Netflix
20 would not have foreclosed its opportunity to sell DVDs to its millions of subscribers – a base of
21 customers who purchase an average 25 DVDs per year each – and would not have promoted new DVD
22 sales by Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com, rather than its own sales, absent an agreement from Wal-
23 Mart and Walmart.com not to compete for Netflix's online DVD rental business.

24 ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

25 47. Defendants' illegal acts and practices caused anticompetitive effects in the online DVD
26 Rental Market. The subscription fees charged by Netflix to Plaintiffs, as well as the other members of
27 the Class, were maintained at artificially high and supracompetitive levels. Plaintiffs and the other
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1 members of the Class paid higher subscription prices to Netflix than they otherwise would have paid in
2 the absence of the Market Division Agreement.

3 48. The Market Division Agreement (i) eliminated one of only three significant competitors
4 in the Relevant Market, (ii) eliminated competition between Defendants, and (iii) enabled Netflix to
5 acquire market power and also acquire and maintain monopoly power in the relevant market. The
6 Market Division Agreement enabled Netflix to implement monopolistic and supracompetitive pricing in
7 the relevant market.

8 49. The Market Division Agreement and Defendants' acts and practices in furtherance
9 thereof have no procompetitive benefits. They do not create information that customers need, nor do
10 they create new or better products or services. Rather, they have served to reinforce the true
11 anticompetitive nature of the Market Division Agreement by assuring, for example, that Walmart.com
12 would withdraw from the online DVD Rental Market, further enhancing Netflix's power in that market.
13 Even if there were any such benefits, those benefits would not outweigh the anticompetitive effects
14 described here, and, in any event, could have been achieved by less restrictive means.

15 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

16 50. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a Class of similarly
17 situated individuals as defined below, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3)
18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

19 51. The "Class" on behalf of whom Plaintiffs bring these claims is defined as:

20 Any person in the United States who paid a subscription fee to Netflix to rent DVDs, on
21 or after May 19, 2005 up to the present. Excluded from the Class are governmental
22 entities, Defendants, their co-conspirators and their representatives, their parents,
23 subsidiaries, and other affiliated entities.

24 52. The Class numbers in the millions, the exact number and identities of the members being
25 known by Defendants.

26 53. The Class is so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members is
27 impracticable.

1 54. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class and the members thereof.
2 These common questions relate to the existence of the conspiracy alleged, and to the type and common
3 pattern of injuries sustained as a result thereof. The questions include, but are not limited to:

- 4 a. Whether Defendants engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy to
5 allocate markets;
6 b. Whether Defendants unreasonably restrained trade in the online DVD rental market;
7 c. Whether Defendant Netflix attempted to monopolize the online DVD rental market;
8 d. The nature and character of the acts performed by Defendants in the furtherance of
9 the alleged contract, combination, and conspiracy;
10 e. Whether the alleged contract, combination, and conspiracy violated Section 1 of the
11 Sherman Act;
12 f. Whether the alleged contract, combination, and conspiracy violated Section 2 of the
13 Sherman Act;
14 g. The anticompetitive effects of Defendants' violations of law;
15 h. Whether Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
16 the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
17 declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole; and
18 i. Whether the conduct of Defendants, as alleged in this Complaint, caused Netflix
19 subscription fees to be higher than they otherwise would have been and thereby
20 caused injury to the business and property of Plaintiffs and other members of the
21 Class.

22 55. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class, including those
23 described above, predominate over questions affecting only individual class members.

24 56. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class and Plaintiffs will fairly and
25 adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs are direct purchasers of subscriptions to rent
26 DVDs online from Netflix and their interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the
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1 other members of the Class. In addition, Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel experienced in
2 class action antitrust litigation.

3 57. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a
4 risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible standards of conduct of
5 Defendants.
6

7 58. Defendants have acted, and refused to act, on ground generally applicable to the Class,
8 thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
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10 59. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
11 of this controversy. The Class is readily definable and is one for which records should exist in the files
12 of Defendant. Prosecution as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation.
13 Treatment as a class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to adjudicate their
14 common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently and without the duplication of effort and
15 expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the
16 adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who otherwise could not afford to
17 litigate an antitrust claim such as is asserted in this Complaint. This class action presents no difficulties
18 of management that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

19 ANTITRUST INJURY AND STANDING

20 60. During the Class Period, Plaintiffs and the members of the class have directly paid
21 monthly DVD subscription fees to Netflix in the United States, and many continue to do so.

22 61. Plaintiffs and the members of the class have suffered, and many continue to suffer, injury
23 of the type that the antitrust laws are designed to punish and prevent. Plaintiffs and the members of the
24 Class have paid, and many continue to pay, more to subscribe to Netflix than they would have paid,
25 absent the Market Division Agreement. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class were, and many
26 continue to be, injured and financially damaged in their businesses and property, on account of
27 Defendants' wrongful conduct. As the direct victims of Defendants' antitrust violations, Plaintiffs are
28 the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust claims made herein.

1 **COUNT ONE**

2 **SHERMAN ACT SECTION ONE (15 U.S.C. § 1)**

3 **Market Allocation of Online DVD Rental Market**

4 **(Against All Defendants)**

5 62. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege their allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 61
6 above.

7 63. Defendants have entered into a *per se* illegal market division agreement, in violation of
8 Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Even if evaluated under the rule of reason, the
9 Market Division Agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the
10 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

11 64. Prior to and at the time of the agreement, Netflix and Walmart.com were actual
12 competitors in the online DVD Rental Market. In addition, Netflix, on the one hand, and Wal-Mart
13 Stores and Walmart.com, on the other hand, were potential competitors in the new DVD sales market.
14 Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com were actual participants and Netflix was a potential participant, with
15 the means and economic incentive to sell new DVDs in the absence of the Market Division Agreement.

16 65. Defendants shared a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve the
17 unlawful objective of dividing the markets for online DVD rentals and new DVD sales. The Market
18 Division Agreement allocated the online DVD Rental Market to Netflix, with Wal-Mart Stores and
19 Walmart.com agreeing not to compete in that relevant market. The agreement also allocated new DVD
20 sales to Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com, with Netflix agreeing to refrain from selling new DVDs in
21 competition with them. In addition to explicitly or *de facto* agreeing not to sell new DVDs, Netflix also
22 obtained the Market Division Agreement by providing potentially valuable promotion to Wal-Mart
23 Stores and Walmart.com. In so doing, Netflix provided significant consideration to Wal-Mart Stores
24 and Walmart.com for their agreement to withdraw from, and not compete in, the online DVD Rental
25 Market.

26 66. The Market Division Agreement created significant anticompetitive effects with no
27 corresponding procompetitive benefits. It eliminated competition in the relevant market, raising prices
28 paid by customers. To the extent that there are any procompetitive benefits at all resulting from the

1 agreement, they do not outweigh the agreement's anticompetitive effects. In any event, to the extent
2 that there are any, they could have been achieved by less restrictive means.

3 67. As a result of this violation of law, Netflix's subscription prices charged to, and paid by,
4 Plaintiffs and the Class are, and have been, higher than they otherwise would have been.

5 **COUNT TWO**

6 **SHERMAN ACT SECTION TWO (15 U.S.C. § 2)**

7 **Monopolization of Online DVD Rental Market**

8 **(Against Netflix)**

9 68. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege their allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 67
10 above.

11 69. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, prohibits the willful monopolization of any
12 part of the trade or commerce among the states.

13 70. The market for online rentals of DVDs constitutes a valid antitrust market. At all times
14 relevant here, Netflix had monopoly or market power and/or economic power in the online DVD rental
15 market.

16 71. Netflix has willfully acquired and maintained its monopoly in the online DVD Rental
17 Market by its acts and practices described here, including by executing, implementing, and otherwise
18 complying with the Market Division Agreement, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
19 15 U.S.C. § 2

20 72. Netflix's monopolistic and exclusionary conduct in the relevant market cannot be
21 tempered through normal market forces. There are significant barriers to entry that prevent competing
22 companies from entering the online DVD rental market, including having a large catalog of DVD titles
23 available to consumers and numerous shipping facilities located throughout the United States.

24 73. As a result of the unlawful conduct alleged herein, Netflix has been able to charge
25 supracompetitive prices and Plaintiffs and the Class paid subscription prices higher than they would
26 have paid but for the anticompetitive conduct.

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74. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege their allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 73 above.

75. Defendants shared a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve the unlawful objective of the monopolization of the online DVD Rental Market. Prior to and at the time of the agreement, Netflix and Walmart.com were actual competitors in the online DVD Rental Market. Defendants conspired with the specific intent, knowledge and purpose that their anticompetitive agreement would result in Netflix willfully acquiring and maintaining a monopoly in the Relevant Market. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com knew that the natural and probable consequence of the Market Division Agreement would be the monopolization of the Relevant Market by Netflix. Defendants have committed overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy, including entering into, complying with, and implementing the Market Division Agreement, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

COUNT FOUR

SHERMAN ACTION SECTION TWO (15 U.S.C. § 2)

Conspiracy to Monopolize Online DVD Rental Market

77. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege their allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 76 above.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1 agreement would result in Netflix willfully acquiring and maintaining a monopoly in the Relevant
2 Market. Wal-Mart Stores and Walmart.com knew that the natural and probable consequence of the
3 Market Division Agreement would be the monopolization of the relevant market by Netflix. Defendants
4 have committed overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy, including entering into, complying with,
5 and implementing the Market Division Agreement, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
6 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

7 79. As a result of this violation of law, Netflix's subscription prices charged to, and paid by
8 Plaintiffs and the Class are, and have been, higher than they otherwise would have been.

9 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that:

11 A. The Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class action under
12 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiffs be appointed class representatives, and
13 that Plaintiffs' counsel be appointed as counsel for the Class;

14 B. Defendants be adjudged to violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ,
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2;

16 C. The Court declare the Market Division Agreement between Defendants
17 announced May 19, 2005, to be unlawful and null and void;

18 D. Judgment be entered for Plaintiffs and members of the Class against Defendants,
19 jointly and severally, for three times the amount of damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class, under
20 Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 15, together with the costs of the action,
21 including reasonable attorneys' fees, and such other relief as is appropriate;

22 E. Defendants, their affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees, and the officers,
23 directors, partners, agents and employees thereof, and all other persons acting or claims to act on their
24 behalf, be permanently enjoined and restrained from, in any manner, continuing, maintaining or
25 renewing the contract, combination or conspiracy alleged herein, or from engaging in any other contract,
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1 combination or conspiracy having similar purpose or effect, and from adopting or following any
2 practice, plan, program or device having a similar purpose or effect, pursuant to Section 16 of the
3 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 29;

4 F. That Plaintiffs and members of the Class be awarded pre- and post-judgment
5 interest, and that that interest be awarded at the highest legal rate from and after the date of service of
6 the initial complaint in this action;

7 G. That Plaintiff and members of the Class recover their costs of this suit, including
8 reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by law; and
9

10 H. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have such other, further, and different
11 relief as the case may require and the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.
12

13 **JURY DEMAND**

14 Pursuant to Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of
15 all issues triable by Jury.
16

17 Dated: January 12, 2009

Respectfully Submitted,

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20 

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